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I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal antitrust laws protect free market competition by prohibiting illegal restraints of trade.' State regulation of economic activity,
however, often imposes or permits anticompetitive restraints of trade
for some articulated purpose in furtherance of public health, safety,
or welfare. Due to these two competing goals, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized immunity from federal antitrust liability
for the anticompetitive conduct of private parties or governmental
entities that act in furtherance of a state's articulated policy goals.2
The Court has fashioned a test for determining antitrust immunity

*Associate, Holland & Knight, Tallahassee, Florida. B.S., Mercer University (1980), M.B.A.,
(1982) M.A., (1982) J.D. (1987), Ph.D. Candidate, University of Florida. The views expressed
are solely those of the author. Portions of this article are contained in Scott D. Makar, Antitrust
Immunity Under Florida'sCertificate of Need Program, 19 FLA. ST. L. REV. 149 (1991) and

Scott D. Makar, Anticompetitive Administrative Action: Antitrust and State Law Remedies,
66 FLA. B. J. 33 (Feb. 1992).
1. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1989); Clayton and Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
12-27 (1989); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4145 (1989).
2. See infra notes 4 & 9.
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called the state action doctrine.3 This doctrine shields the state-authorized and state-supervised actions of private parties and the stateauthorized actions of governmental entities.
This article examines current developments regarding the state
action immunity doctrine and its application to the anticompetitive
conduct of private parties and governmental entities. The article
further discusses recent precedents from both the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Over the
past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has issued approximately one
opinion per term related to the development of the state action doctrine. 4 Because the doctrine is based on shifting concepts of federalism
and states' rights, the Court's efforts in recent years to refine the
doctrine's parameters have not resulted in clearly-defined tests or
immutable principles. Instead, the Court has shaped the doctrine to
accommodate economic competition in a national economy versus
parochial state economic regulations.
In recent years, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has become
a forerunner in the state action area because it has addressed a number
of novel state action immunity issues. The court's review of these
state action cases en banc indicates both the importance of the doctrine
and the struggle among the court's members to accommodate federal
and state interests.

II.

STATE ACTION DOCTRINE: BACKGROUND

Antitrust scholars agree that a primary purpose of the federal
antitrust laws is to safeguard economic competition. 5 In contrast to

3. The antitrust state action doctrine is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the
state action concept used in constitutional analysis. The former is based on principles of federalism
and accordingly reflects that state involvement and control of otherwise illegal anticompetitive
conduct is accorded immunity from the antitrust laws. The latter concept, which is not limited
to only state interests, is more appropriately termed the "governmental action" doctrine used
to determine under what circumstances federal constitutional principles apply. LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1688 n.2 (2d ed. 1988).
4. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., No. 89-1671, 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991);
Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988); Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987); FTC v.
Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986);
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. U.S., 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Town of Hallie v.
City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984); Rice v. Norman
Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455
U.S. 40 (1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, 433 U.S. 530 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
5.

E.

THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY

L.

HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND
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this federal goal, many state regulations and state-authorized private
agreements are designed to restrain or eliminate competition in furtherance of state interests. For example, state medical boards license
health care practitioners to protect the public from unqualified medical
professionals. Cities impose rent controls, ostensibly to ensure affordable housing. State public utility commissions regulate the electric
power industry to protect against monopolistic rates. Each of these
regulatory systems restrains free economic competition for some articulated state interest.
Ordinarily, the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution
operates to preempt state law provisions that are inconsistent with
federal law. 6 The United States Supreme Court, however, has carved
out an exception to this principle for state laws that regulate various
types of economic activity in furtherance of public safety, health or
welfare. 7 The exception, termed the state action doctrine, is the Supreme Court's attempt to accommodate the federal interest in promoting nationwide competition and the parochial interests of the states
in restricting competition in their traditional areas of regulation.8
A.

The State Action Immunity Test: Its Requirements

The United States Supreme Court has established a two-part test
for determining antitrust immunity which distinguishes between the
anticompetitive conduct of private parties and governmental entities.
The Court's state action immunity doctrine 9 provides that anticompetitive conduct of private parties is immune from antitrust liability if the
state: 1) has clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a state
policy to displace competition with regulation; and 2) actively super-

ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 1-2 (1988); ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 58-58 (1985); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 50-77 (1978).

6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 2. See Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965)(noting
that if a state measure conflicts with a federal requirement, the state provision must give way);
United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977)(stating that
federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws).
7. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
8. See Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 668,
669 (1991); Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the
Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 499-501 (1987).
9. The doctrine is also termed the Parker doctrine based on Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943), the seminal case in which the Supreme Court upheld the actions of a state commission
that set prices and restricted the output of raisin growers.
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vises the private anticompetitive conduct.10 This legal test, known as
the Midcal test," immunizes private anticompetitive conduct if the
conduct is carried out pursuant to a "clearly articulated" state policy
and is "actively supervised" by the state. When a state or one of its
political subdivisions engages in anticompetitive conduct, only the first
part of the state action test is considered (i.e., whether a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy exists).12 In the
governmental realm, the active state supervision part of the test is
not considered because private anticompetitive conduct is generally
not involved.13
The Supreme Court's recent precedents have made the "clearly
articulated state policy" part of the test easier to satisfy and the
"active state supervision" part more difficult. 14 This trend reflects
the
Supreme Court's increased willingness to defer to a state's political
process as long as the state does not delegate the power to restrain
competition. The "clear articulation" prong of the state action test is
met if a state explicitly authorizes private parties or a governmental
entity to engage in the anticompetitive conduct.15 A state policy that
neither permits nor contemplates the particular anticompetitive actions
is not sufficient.16 State policies which are neutral to anticompetitive

10. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
The Court has displaced the "active supervision" prong of the test with an "active control"
requirement. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
11. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980). The state action doctrine may operate to bar state antitrust claims as well. For example,
Florida's antitrust laws provide that "[a]ny activity or conduct exempt under Florida statutory
or common law or exempt from the provisions of the antitrust laws of the United States is
exempt from the provisions of this chapter." FLA. STAT. § 542.20 (1991). Florida and federal
cases discussing the state action doctrine's application under Florida's antitrust laws have applied
the federal state action immunity test. See, e.g., Sebring Utils. Comm'n v. Home Sav. Ass'n,
508 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (application of test to municipality).
12. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S.
558 (1984) (committee established by state supreme court to grade bar exams immune from
antitrust liability); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (state supreme court's
restraint on attorney advertising is immune from federal antitrust attack).
13. In some instances, governmental officials or agencies may be alleged to be in a conspiracy
with private parties in restraint of trade. The Supreme Court, however, recently ruled that a
"conspiracy" exception to the state action immunity doctrine is not available in
such situations.
See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 42 and accompanying text of Southern Motor Carriers.
15. See, e.g., Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1991).
16. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 55-56 (1982) (municipality exercising its general home rule powers not immune because no clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy).
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actions are also insufficient.1 7 State compulsion of the challenged conduct, however, is not required. In Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States, 8 the Supreme Court considered
whether express statutory authority compelling the anticompetitive
conduct was necessary. The Court ruled that the absence of compelled
conduct does not necessarily doom a claim of antitrust immunity.19
In Southern Motor Carriers,the Mississippi public service commission actively encouraged collective ratemaking among competing common carriers. This encouragement was in the form of a state statute
that authorized the commission to establish "just and reasonable" rates
for the intrastate transportation of commodities. 20 In reviewing the
"clearly articulated" prong of the test, the Supreme Court held that
the private ratemaking activities were state-authorized and therefore
immune. 2' The Court stated:
A private party acting pursuant to an anticompetitive regulatory program need not "point to a specific detailed legislative authorization" for its challenged conduct. As long as
the State as sovereign clearly intends to displace competition
in a particular field with a regulatory structure, the first
prong of the Midcal test is satisfied.This relaxed standard greatly defers to state regulatory interests,
making it easier to establish antitrust immunity even though the challenged conduct is not compelled. The United States Supreme Court
has yet to consider whether conduct that is ostensibly state-authorized
but unnecessary to achieve a statute's expressed regulatory purpose
meets the "clearly articulated" prong of the state action test.
The active state supervision requirement also requires that the
state exercise ultimate control over the state-authorized anticompetitive conduct of private parties.2 This requirement ensures that private

17. Id. at 55.
18. 471 U.S. 48 (1985). The United States charged that the collective ratemaking activities
of private rate bureaus composed of motor common carriers violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Id. at 50.
19. Id. at 58-59. The Court reversed the lower court's (en banc) majority. The case was
carried over from the Fifth Circuit when the Eleventh Circuit was created. The case therefore
is identified as a Fifth Circuit case. 672 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), vacated, 702 F.2d 532
(5th Cir. Unit B 1983) (en banc), rev'd 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
20. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 63.
21. Id. at 64.
22. Id. at 64.
23. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100-01 (1988).
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parties will act consistent with state policy rather than pursuant to
their own economic interests. The United States Supreme Court's
refusal to extend immunity to private actors under a number of regulatory structures due to the lack of active state supervision of the
anticompetitive acts of private parties demonstrates that state action
immunity is increasingly difficult to establish.For example, in Patrick v. Burget5 the Court made the "active
state supervision" prong of the state action test more difficult to meet.
In holding that an Oregon medical peer review statute did not provide
immunity, the Court clarified the meaning of the active state supervision requirement by stating that:
The requirement is designed to ensure that the state-action
doctrine will shelter only the particular anticompetitive acts
of private parties that, in the judgment of the State, actually
further state regulatory policies. To accomplish this purpose,
the active supervision requirement mandates that the State
exercise ultimate control over the challenged anticompetitive
conduct. The mere presence of some state involvement or
monitoring does not suffice. The active supervision prong
• . . requires that state officials have and exercise power to
review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and
disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy. Absent
such a program of supervision, there is no realistic assurance
that a private party's anticompetitive conduct promotes state
26
policy, rather than merely the party's individual interests.
The emphasized language indicates that "active supervision" requires
more than mere state involvement in or monitoring of the private
parties' conduct. Instead, the state must "exercise ultimate control"
over the anticompetitive conduct. This requirement makes the second

24. See id. (insufficient state supervision of hospital peer-review process); see also Liquor
Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987) (no active state supervision of resale price maintenance
system); FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (anticompetitive collusion among
dentists regarding provision of x-rays to insurers not immune because no active state supervision); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980)
(insufficient state involvement in price-setting system). The Court is also considering another
case involving the active state supervision part of the test in its 1991-92 term. See infra notes
77-86 and accompanying text.
25. 486 U.S. 94 (1988). For an overview of medical peer review immunity in light of Patrick,
see generally F.M. Langley, Does Medical PeerReview Immunity Exist After Patrick v. Burget?
A Review of the Legal Fundamentals, 2 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137 (1988-89).
26. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100-01 (emphasis added).
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part of the Midcal test more difficult to satisfy by ensuring that states
have significant control over the anticompetitive actions of private
parties before immunity is available. The more stringent requirements
also protect the federal interest in assuring economic competition in
markets where the state's interest could be subverted through private
parties' self-motivated conduct.
B.

Omni Outdoor Advertising

The United States Supreme Court's 1991 opinion in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.- further eases the requirements of the "clearly articulated" prong of the state action immunity
test and signals more deference to the sometimes anticompetitive results of the political process. In Omni Outdoor Advertising, a Columbia, South Carolina billboard advertising company with substantially
all of the local billboard advertising market had very close relations
with the city's political leaders and officials. The company successfully
lobbied these city officials to enact zoning ordinances restricting
further billboard construction. Because these ordinances severely hindered a rival billboard company's ability to enter the market and
compete, the rival company sued both the city and the dominant
billboard company claiming violations of the federal and state antitrust
laws.
The plaintiffs claimed that the city officials and the dominant
billboard company had engaged in an anticompetitive conspiracy that
stripped them of whatever state action immunity they may have otherwise had. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the trial
court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the defendants.
The appellate court, in a split decision, reversed and reinstated the
jury's verdict.On appeal, the Supreme Court considered for the first time whether
a "conspiracy" exception to the state action immunity doctrines
existed. The Court's majority rejected the exception based on the
impracticability of defining and identifying what constitutes an illegal
"conspiracy" between government officials and their constituents.2
The court explained that if a "conspiracy" means nothing more than
an agreement to impose the regulation in question, the "exception

27. No. 89-1671, 1991, 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991). Justice Scalia wrote the majority in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter concurred.
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices White and Marshall. Id.
28. Id. at 1348.
29. Id. at 1355-56.
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would virtually swallow up the Parkerrule" because "[a]ll anticompetitive regulation would be Vulnerable to a 'conspiracy' charge."3°
The Omni Outdoor Advertising Court similarly rejected the rival
company's argument that there should be an exception to immunity
in instances of governmental "corruption." The Court based this holding on the inherent difficulties in determining what would constitute
"corruption" for purposes of the exception.31 First, if "corruption" was
defined as "not acting in the public interest," it would be impractical
to determine whether an official acted in the "public interest" or in
his or her own "private interest." Second, if "corruption" were defined
as some unlawful activity under federal or state law (such as bribery),
the purposes of the antitrust laws would not be furthered by prohibitions on such activities. Finally, if "the invalidating 'conspiracy' is
limited to some element of unlawfulness (beyond mere anticompetitive
motivation), the invalidation would have nothing to do with the policies
of the antitrust laws.32 In summary, the Court held that the policies
of the antitrust laws do not impose a code of ethics on public officials
or private parties. 33
An important issue in Omni Outdoor Advertising, though somewhat relegated to a battle in the opinion's footnotes, was whether the
"clearly articulated" part of the state action test had been met. 3 In
finding that this prong was satisfied, the majority opinion held that
broad delegations of powers to municipalities to regulate for the general welfare bestow antitrust immunity. The court held this immunity
valid even though the delegated powers do not specifically authorize
economic regulation of a specific industry. The statute at issue in
Omni Outdoor Advertising granted municipalities the authority to
regulate buildings and other structures "[f]or the purpose of promoting
health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the community." '35 The
statute, however, did not specifically authorize the regulation of
billboards.
Nevertheless, the majority considered the statute sufficiently broad
to protect "existing billboards against some competition from newcomers.'36 The Court stated "[i]t is enough... if suppression of competition

30. Id. at 1351. The Parker rule is synonymous with the antitrust state action immunity
doctrine. See supra note 9.
31. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 111 S. Ct. at 1352.
32. Id. at 1356.
33. Id. at 1353.
34. Id. at 1350 n.4.
35. Id. at 1349 n.3.
36. Id. at 1350.
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is the 'foreseeable result' of what the statute authorizes. ' '37 Because
a "municipality need not 'be able to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization' in order to assert a successful [state action] defense to an antitrust suit," the lack of specific authority in the statute
did not lessen or eliminate the city's immunity.- The Court in Omni
Outdoor Advertising, therefore, held that the scope of the "clearly
articulated" prong of the state action test is flexible and expansive
enough to include most delegations of regulatory authority, whether
exercised by municipalities or private parties. The Court's holding
effectively replaces the "clearly articulated" prong of the state action
test with a more deferential "clearly delegated" standard 9

III.

RECENT ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CASE LAW

The Supreme Court's precedents on antitrust immunity issues leave
unanswered many important questions. For instance, is judicial supervision of challenged private conduct sufficient? Can a state immunize
private anticompetitive agreements by ratifying them legislatively? Is
active state supervision necessary in such instances? In recent years,
the Eleventh Circuit has addressed a number of these interesting
state action immunity issues. These decisions involved anticompetitive
conduct by both private parties and governmental entities.
A.

Private Anticompetitive Conduct

While the Supreme Court eased the requirements of the first part
of the Midcal test in Omni, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bolt v.
Halifax Hospital Medical Center40 demonstrates that there is no immunity for anticompetitive conduct that the state legislature did not
foresee. The court analyzed whether Florida's medical peer review
statute satisfied the first part of the state action test. A physician
alleged that a hospital district, the hospital and its staff had conspired
to boycott his services and to deny him staff privileges. The hospital
district claimed antitrust immunity and asserted that Florida's peer
4
review statute satisfied the first part of the Midcal test. '

37. Id. (citations omitted) (citing Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42).
38. Id. at 1350 n.4 (quoting Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 39, and City of Lafayette, 435
U.S. at 415).
39. See Garland, supra note 8, at 501 (state action test is "an effort to control delegation"
and seeks to "bar delegation to private parties of the power to restrain competition").
40. 891 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1990), on remandfrom, 874 F.2d 755 (1989) (en banc), reinstating
in part and vacating in part, 851 F.2d 1273 (1988).
41. Id. at 823. The court analyzed only the "clearly expressed state policy" part because
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After considerable appellate proceedings, 4z the Eleventh Circuit
determined that in authorizing medical peer review the Florida legislature clearly articulated a policy to displace competition. The legislature could foresee that hospital districts would rely upon recommendations made by a physician's peers in exercising their "virtually unreviewable power" to hire (or not hire) physicians.- Nonetheless, the
court stated, "[W]hile the Florida legislature must have foreseen that
[the medical district] would engage in anticompetitive conduct based
on recommendations of the physician's peers, nothing indicates that
the legislature should have foreseen the type of anticompetitive conduct alleged in this case [i.e., a conspiracy to boycott].""
The court in Bolt held that the hospital district was without immunity because "its conduct constitutes anticompetitive conduct that is
not a foreseeable result of [the hospital district's] enabling legislation"
and is inconsistent with the district's requirement to act in the "public
good. '45 The excluded physician therefore properly alleged an unauthorized and unforeseeable conspiracy of which the hospital district
46
was purportedly a member.
Two other recent opinions from the Eleventh Circuit illustrate the
difficulty in satisfying the active state supervision prong of the Midcal
test. Consistent with recent Supreme Court precedents, 47 these opinions indicate that active state control of challenged conduct is required
before antitrust immunity will attach. In Shahawy v. Harrison,4 the
district court held that Florida's peer review system immunized a
hospital board from federal antitrust liability. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed, however, because it held Florida's peer review system "fails
to actively supervise the hospital board's decisions. 49Although Florida

it found the hospital district sufficiently similar to a municipality thus requiring only the single
prong test of Town of Hallie. Id. at 824.
42. The original panel opinion held that the "active supervision" part of the test had been
met through judicial oversight of Florida's regulatory system. 851 F.2d 1273 (1988). The court
then voted to hear the case en banc. At oral argument, however, the appellants withdrew their
state action immunity claims. 874 F.2d 755, 756 (1989) (en banc). Thus, the court did not resolve
the issue of whether judicial oversight can constitute "active state supervision." The United
States Supreme Court has not yet resolved this issue.
43. Bolt, 891 F.2d at 825.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. Thus if the physician can prove his allegations. The conduct of the hospital district
will not be exempt from liability for antitrust violations. Id.
47. See Patrick and other cases cited in note 24, supra.
48. 875 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989).
49. Id. at 1535. The court stated that because the active state supervision prong was not
met, it did not need to address the clear articulation prong of the test. It appears, however,
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enacted a "comprehensive scheme regulating health care" and delineated the scope of state involvement, the critical element of state
supervision was lacking. In particular, the court noted that "no state
official reviews specific peer review board decisions regarding clinical
privileges to determine whether such decisions comport with state
policy. " 5 The hospital board, therefore, had no antitrust immunity.
In a highly controversial case, Consolidated Gas Co. v. City Gas
Co., 51 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court's finding that
territorial agreements entered by natural gas utility companies and
approved by the Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC) were not
immune from antitrust liability. The en banc court reinstated the panel
opinion and held that Florida law did not provide a clearly articulated
state policy of permitting such agreements nor was there active state
supervision. 52 Although the Supreme Court accepted certiorari, the
parties settled their dispute during the pendency of the appeal.Although the parties' settlement on appeal vacates the lower court
opinions, a review of the Eleventh Circuit's analysis is nevertheless
informative. The reinstated panel opinion of Consolidated Gas recited
the relaxed standard articulated in Southern Motor Carriers that a
"statute need not explicitly state what conduct is and is not permissible
in order for that conduct to be undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. '"- Nonetheless, the court rejected the argument
that the "clearly articulated" part of the Midcal test was satisfied

that the court's analysis was improper because the defendant hospital board in Shahawy was
a public rather than private entity. The court therefore should not have addressed the second
prong. Town of Hallie. Instead, it should have determined only whether the first prong was
met. Nevertheless, its analysis of the second prong is instructive.
50. Id.
51. 880 F.2d 297 (11th Cir.), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 889 F.2d 264 (1989), on
reh'g, 912 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (per curiam opinion reinstating panel opinion),
cert. granted and judgment vacated as moot, No. 89-1671, 1991 U.S., 111 S. Ct. 1300 (1991),
on remand, 931 F.2d 710 (11th Cir. 1991)(remanded to trial court with instructions to vacate
and dismiss action with prejudice). Ten judges, including two judges who were on the panel
opinion, participated in the en banc proceedings. A majority of seven judges agreed to affirm
the judgment of the district court. Two of these judges, however, were unwilling to affirm the
holding of the district court and panel opinion finding no antitrust immunity. Thus, five of the
ten en banc judges dissented on the ground that the state action immunity doctrine should
apply to the facts at issue. Because the en banc court was equally divided on the state action
immunity issue, the panel opinion's holding prevailed. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion and the
trial court's order, however, were vacated as moot following the parties' settlement of the suit.
931 F.2d at 711.
52. Consolidated Gas, 912 F.2d at 1265.
53. Consolidated Gas, 111 S.Ct. 1300 (1991).
54. Consolidated Gas, 880 F. 2d at 302.
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even though the Florida Supreme Court had previously concluded that
the FPSC had authority to approve these agreements. 55 The Eleventh
Circuit stated that the determination of whether the "clearly articulated" prong of the test is satisfied is "ultimately a question of federal
antitrust law."' The court therefore undertook its own inquiry and
found persuasive the fact that other utilities (such as electric utilities)
had express authority to enter territorial agreements while natural
gas utilities did not.5 7 It therefore concluded that "no clearly articulated state policy authorized this agreement."The court also held that active state supervision did not exist
because: (a) the FPSC had no express authority to develop standards
for creating or reviewing such agreements on a regular basis, 59 and
(b) judicial supervision over the territorial agreements was insufficient
to meet the "active supervision" prong of the test.6° The court stated
"the Supreme Court has consistently contemplated a more vigorous,
probing supervision than mere acquiescence. This is at bottom an
agreement entered by private parties, in pursuit of their own economic
interests, that is neither authorized by the State, nor closely monitored

by

''
it. 61

In another electric utility case, Municipal Utilities Board of Albertville v. Alabama Power Co.,62 thirty municipal and public corporations that own and operate electric distribution facilities sued twentytwo rural electric cooperatives, a rural electric association, and a private electric power company. The plaintiffs alleged that these defendants illegally agreed to horizontally divide electric service territories.

55. Twenty-seven years ago, the Florida Supreme Court issued its opinion in City Gas Co.
v. Peoples Gas System, 182 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1965).
56. Consolidated Gas, 880 F.2d at 303.
57. Id. at 302. The Florida Statutes expressly grant electric utilities such authority but is
silent as to natural gas utilities. The court found this "compelling evidence that the Legislature
in fact did not intend for natural gas utilities to also enjoy exclusive territorial agreements."
Id. In addition, the FPSC had itself expressed doubt regarding its authority in a 1985 tariff
filing. In this action, however, the FPSC urged the court to find that antitrust immunity existed.
Id. at 301-02.
58. Id. at 303.
59. Id. The court also noted that this agreement was the only one of its kind in Florida.
60. Id. (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit had addressed this issue before. See Bolt
v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 874 F.2d 755, 756 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc). Although the
panel opinion in Bolt held that judicial supervision can satisfy the active supervision test, the
plaintiff abandoned its argument on this point at the en banc argument. Id.
61. Consolidated Gas, 880 F.2d at 303.
62. 934 F.2d 1493 (llth Cir. 1991).
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The plaintiffs also contended that the defendants conspired with the
Alabama legislature to ratify and thereby immunize existing, though
otherwise illegal, territorial agreements through legislative action. The
general provisions of the Alabama acts in question assigned service
territories ("legislatively-assigned" territories) to private and municipal electric suppliers for the stated purpose of limiting wasteful duplication of transmission facilities.6 In addition, "special rules" in the
acts incorporated private territorial agreements previously reached
claims
by electric suppliers.- The trial court dismissed the antitrust
65
doctrines.
Noerr-Pennington
and
action
state
the
based on
The Eleventh Circuit, in Municipal Utilities, addressed whether
the legislatively-assigned and the privately-assigned service territories
were shielded from antitrust scrutiny under the state action immunity
doctrine. The court concluded that the legislatively-assigned territories
met the two-part state action test. First, the Alabama legislature had
clearly articulated a policy to displace competition in the retail electric
service market, and second, active state supervision was provided
66
through strict state control over the assignment of such territories.
Moreover, the court determined that the legislature controlled all of
the decisions regarding the division of these service territories, and
that private parties exercised no regulatory authority over the challenged restraints. 67 The court could not determine, however, whether
there was active state supervision of the privately-assigned agreements. Consequently, the court remanded the case for consideration
of whether the private agreements qualified for state action immunity
under the active supervision prong. 68
The court's decision, therefore, further demonstrates the stringent
requirement of active state control of a challenged anticompetitive
restraint under the second part of the Midcal test. In light of Omni
Outdoor Advertising, the court held that the plaintiffs' arguments in
favor of a "public co-conspirator exception" to the state action doctrine
were foreclosed.69 The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that

63. Id. at 1496.
64. Id. at 1497.
65. Id. at 1498. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which is based on the petition clause of
the First Amendment, immunizes the anticompetitive actions of private parties undertaken in
a genuine attempt to influence government. See Scott Makar, Anticompetitive Actions in the
Administrative Forum: Antitrust and State Law Remedies, 65 FLA. B.J. 33, 34-36 (1992).
66. Municipal Utilites, 934 F.2d at 1503-04.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1504-05.
69. Id. The court in its previous opinion had permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint
to allege facts supporting such an exception. Municipal Utils. Bd., 925 F.2d at 1395.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 4

the Alabama legislature merely "ratified" private anticompetitive
agreements among the defendants by enacting the general provisions
contained in the service territory acts.
The Municipal Utilities court stated that a fundamental principle
of antitrust law is that a state cannot immunize private anticompetitive
activities by merely passing a law declaring them legal or authorizing
them . 70 The court held, however, that a "ratification" exception is
unavailable when the requirements of the Midcal test are met. This
is because, by definition, the state actively supervises the state-authorized private anticompetitive conduct. 7' Thus, the court rejected
the plaintiffs' "ratification" argument as to the general provisions of
the Acts. The court remanded consideration of the private agreements
to the district court.
B.

Anticompetitive Governmental Conduct

In the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Authority, 72 a hospital organized as a health care authority
under Alabama law excluded a neurologist from the medical staff. The
neurologist sued the hospital for federal antitrust violations. The hospital claimed antitrust immunity based on the Alabama Health Care
Authority Act. The Act authorized hospitals to establish themselves
as health care authorities and empowered such authorities to "select
and appoint medical and dental staff members and others licensed to
practice the healing arts."73 Based upon its analysis of the Act, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the hospital had antitrust immunity.74
The Todorov court first held that the Act clearly authorized the
challenged conduct (i.e., regulation of staff privileges). Second, the
court found that the Act made clear that the state's policy was to
displace competition in the health care field. Finally, the court noted
that the Act made it explicit that such conduct, even if deemed to be
anticompetitive and violative of the state or federal antitrust laws,
was authorized pursuant to state authority. Based upon the state's
clear delegation of power to health care authorities and the state's
clear statement of its public policy in displacing competition, the Todorov court held that "this case involves a statute that expressly

70. Municipal Utils., 934 F.2d at 1504 (citing Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106, and Omni Outdoor
Advertising, 111 S. Ct. at 1353).
71. Id. at 1505.
72. 921 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1991).
73. Id. at 1460.
74. Id.
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authorizes anticompetitive conduct. ' 75 The court, therefore, held that
antitrust immunity was mandatory because the hospital, as a health
care planning authority, was a "political subdivision" of the state. 6

IV.

TICOR TITLE INSURANCE AND THE FUTURE OF
STATE ACTION

The United States Supreme Court is currently reviewing a state
action immunity case arising from a Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
77
challenge to the conduct of six national title insurance companies.
The case, FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.,78 provides the Court with
the opportunity to further refine the active state supervision part of
the state action test. The case also may provide additional insight into
the current Supreme Court's perspective on how much deference
should be given to state political and regulatory interests.
In 1985, the Ticor Title Insurance litigation began when the FTC
issued an administrative complaint charging six of the largest national
title insurance companies with conduct constituting unfair methods of
competition. The challenged conduct involved the companies' practice
of collectively agreeing to set the rates they charged for their title
search and examination services.7 An administrative law judge held
that the companies had committed violations in two states, Connecticut
and Wisconsin, because these states provided no supervision of the
collective rate-setting and therefore did not meet the active supervision
requirement.- The administrative law judge ruled, however, that the
insurance companies established the state action immunity defense in
five other states, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, because these states authorized and actively supervised the
companies' rate-setting activities.81
The FTC then conducted an independent review of the matter and
rejected the insurance companies' state action defense for six of the
states. 82 The FTC ruled that in New Jersey and Pennsylvania the
state statutes did not articulate a policy to displace competition with

75.
76.
77.
ing, 62
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 1462.
Id.
See Supreme Court Hears Argument on Extent of Immunity for Title Insurer RatemakAntitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1548, at 33 (January 16, 1992).
922 F.2d 1122 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. granted 60 U.S.L.W. 3217 (Oct. 8, 1991)(No. 91-72).
Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1126.
Id.
Id. at 1126-27.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 4

regulation. In Arizona, Connecticut, Montana, and Wisconsin, the
FTC held that the active state supervision requirement was not met.8
The FTC therefore ordered the title insurance companies to cease and
desist from using rating bureaus in those six states for the purpose
of setting rates."
The Third Circuit later vacated the FTC's cease and desist order
with respect to New Jersey and Pennsylvania based on its determination that these states clearly articulated a state policy of displacing
competition in title insurance rate-setting activities.r The court further
held that the regulatory systems in Arizona, Connecticut, Montana,
and Wisconsin met the active state supervision part of the state action
immunity test.8 7 The court based its holding on a four factor test
established by the First Circuit in a rate-setting case, New England
Motor Rate Bureau v. FTC.88 This test evaluates whether any of the
following four factors (which are indicators of active state supervision)
exist in the state's regulatory system: 1) whether the state establishes
the rates; 2) whether the state reviews the reasonableness of the
rates; 3) whether the state monitors market conditions; and 4) whether
the state has engaged in any "pointed reexamination" of its program. 9
The court in Ticor Title Insurance applied the test, finding that
the absence of two of the four factors was not fatal to the establishment
of the active state supervision requirement.- The court found active
state supervision in Arizona, Connecticut, Montana, and Wisconsin
based solely on evidence of the first two factors (i.e., whether the
state establishes the rates and reviews their reasonableness). In the
court's view, the lack of the latter two factors (i.e., no state system
that monitors market conditions and no "pointed reexamination" of
the state's regulatory program) was insufficient to override the importance of the first two factors. 91

83. Id. at 1126.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1127. One of the six original respondent-companies had subsequently settled the
action in a consent agreement and was not affected by the FTC's final order. Id. at 1125 n.2.
86. Id. at 1129-35. The FTC had stipulated that New Jersey and Pennsylvania met the
active state supervision requirement. Id. at 1129.
87. Id. at 1135-40.
88. 908 F.2d 1064 (1st Cir. 1990).
89. 922 F.2d at 1135. The court derived the four factors from the Supreme Court's opinions
in California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) and
Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987).

90.
91.

Ticor, 922 F.2d at 1136.
Id. at 1137.
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The Supreme Court's resolution of the active state supervision
issue in Ticor Title Insurance will provide an indication of whether
the Court places greater weight on state regulatory convenience or
national economic competition. The relaxed standard that the lower
appellate court applied permits states to provide passive or "negative"
monitoring92 of otherwise state-authorized conduct by private parties.
A reduced level of state oversight and control of the private conduct
permits the ostensibly regulated parties to engage in a greater degree
of unauthorized, anticompetitive conduct. As a result, greater deviation from the national interest in economic competition could result.
The Court must also consider whether a standard that is overly deferential towards state interests may, in addition to undermining the
federal interest in competition, actually restrict states' regulatory options. For instance, a state may decide to forego new regulatory programs because of its concern that private parties may engage in a
level of anticompetitive conduct beyond that the state can afford to
control or supervise. This concern is particularly acute during periods
when state budgets are severely constrained. States may also have
apprehension that because private parties would only have to prove
a low level of state supervision, antitrust immunity may extend to
activities the state did not intend to immunize. For instance, a state
may enact a regulatory regime, although not intending to immunize
private conduct from antitrust scrutiny, that nonetheless meets the
lower threshold standards for active state supervision. Private parties
might successfully argue that they are entitled to state action immunity
in these instances despite only a meager amount of state oversight.
Private parties, however, favor a reduced, deferential standard for
the active state supervision requirement because it would lessen the
ability of courts to substitute their judgement for that of state regulators. Their concern is that the uncertainty regarding the appropriate level of state supervision should be resolved in favor of antitrust
immunity. Thus, a deferential standard would provide some safeguard
against judicial second-guessing in situations where private parties act
pursuant to a regulatory system and the state fails to provide (or
diminishes) that level of its control or supervision necessary to establish immunity. In these situations, private parties will be less willing
to participate in such programs if they can later be subject to antitrust

92. The "negative" monitoring option refers to situations in which the state does not engage
in any active review of the market place and does not undertake a "pointed reexamination" of
its regulatory system on a systematic basis. See Supreme Court Hears Argument on Extent of
Immunity for Title Insurer Ratemaking, supra note 77.
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liability because a court determines that the supervision provided is
inadequate. Thus the key question in Ticor Title Insurance is the
degree of involvement, monitoring, and control that is necessary for
a state regulatory system to safeguard the federal interest in competition without unduly imposing onerous regulatory requirements on
the states.
V.

CONCLUSION

Over the past years, the United States Supreme Court has continually refined the contours of the state action immunity doctrine. The
Ticor Title Insurance case will provide an indication whether the
1991-92 Court will continue to defer to state regulatory interests or
will revitalize the federal interest in national economic competition.
Like the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit has recently decided
a number of important and novel state action issues. The Bolt,
Shahawy, Consolidated Gas, and Alabama Power Company opinions
indicate the Eleventh Circuit's reluctance to find antitrust immunity
in the absence of explicit legislative authority for, and active state
control of, the challenged private anticompetitive conduct. The
Eleventh Circuit mandates a clear showing of state authorization of
the challenged conduct and a substantial degree of active and continuous state supervision and control over the private actors in order to
establish antitrust immunity. The court's decision in Todorov indicates
the lesser burden of establishing antitrust immunity for governmental
entities under the first part of the Midcal test. Consistent with the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Omni Outdoor Advertising, the
Eleventh Circuit has generally deferred to a state's regulatory interests and recognized antitrust immunity where a governmental entity acts within its delegated authority.
Author's Note: Near the end of its 1991-92 term, the United
States Supreme Court issued its opinion in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 60 U.S.L.W. 4515 (U.S. June 12, 1992) (No. 91-72). Consistent with the trend in its prior ruling (as discussed in this article),
the Court made the active state supervision prong of the Midcal test
more difficult to establish. In reversing the Third Circuit, the Court
stated:
The purpose of the active state supervision inquiry is not
to'determine whether the State has met some normative
standard, such as efficiency, in its regulatory practices. Its
purpose is to determine whether the State has exercised
sufficient independent judgment and control so that the details of the rates and prices have been established as a product of deliberative state intervention, not simply by agree-

ANTITRUST AND STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

ment among private parties. Much as in causation inquiries,
the analysis asks whether the State has played a substantial
role in determining the specifics of the economic policy. The
question is not how well state regulation works but whether
the anticompetitive scheme is the State's own.9 3
Based upon this statement of purpose, the Court held that title insurers in Wisconsin and Montana failed to establish active state supervision, and that the regulatory schemes in Connecticut and Arizona
would have to be reconsidered on remand.94
The Court made clear that the "mere potential for state supervision
is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State."9 5 In situations
where private parties initially set prices, the "party claiming the immunity must show that state officials have undertaken the necessary
steps to determine the specifics of the price-fixing or ratre-setting
scheme. '" 6 Because rates in Wisconsin and Montana were only checked
for mathematical accuracy (or in some instances not checked at all),
the requisite degree of state involvement was lacking.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion was joined by five other Justices, including Justice Scalia who wrote a short concurrence. Although
he agreed with the majority's legal conclusions, he believed that private parties will be less willing to participate in state programs because
of the fear of antitrust liability. Private parties simply will not know
until after they have participated in a state program whether the
state's supervision will have been "active" enough to establish immun97
ity.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor wrote separate dissents that elaborated further on the unmanagability and ambiguity of
the Court's active state supervision standard. Chief Justice Rehnquist
believed it was unwise to place federal courts in the "position of determining the efficacy of a particular State's regulatory scheme." 98 Such
an inquiry requires a court to make normative judgment about whether
a state's supervision is vigorous enough to establish immunity. 99 Similarly, Justice O'Connor, in a dissent joined by Justice Thomas, decried

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 4518-19.
at 4520.
at 4519.
at 4520.
at 4522.
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the reduction in states' regulatory flexibility "by creating an impossible
situation for those subject to state regulation."', The majority's imposition of "after-the-fact" evaluation of a state's regulatory system "is
extremely unfair to regulated parties."11 Further, the majority's requirement that the state play a "substantial role" in determining the
specifics of regulatory policy creates an ambiguous and counterproductive standard. Finally, the majority's standard will now require that
state regulators "serve as witnesses in civil litigation and respond to
02
allegations that they did not do their job.'

100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.

